Orbis Global Balanced

We aim to produce a pleasing long-term return that is superior to Orbis Global Balanced's benchmark 60/40 Index of global stocks and bonds. Doing so is only possible because we are willing to build a portfolio that is very different from the make-up of the benchmark. This difference doesn't always accrue to the benefit of returns, however, and 2018 has thus far been one of those times. Such underperformance is uncomfortable, for clients and for us. But times like this are also inevitable, and we have to embrace it to achieve long-term outperformance. You can't beat the index by hugging it.

Academics have come up with a measure to calculate how different a portfolio is from its benchmark—the portfolio's "active share". Going security-by-security, active share looks at differences in weights between a portfolio and its benchmark, then sums them up. A fund that exactly mirrors its benchmark would have an active share of 0%, while a fund that has absolutely no overlap with its benchmark would have an active share of 100%. The current active share of the Orbis Global Balanced portfolio is 95%, meaning that only 5% of the portfolio overlaps with the benchmark.

Over the long term, having a very different portfolio is what allows us to deliver better returns. But it cuts both ways. In the short and medium term, there will be times when the market rather violently disagrees with us. This typically occurs when investors become overly focused on short-term issues, pushing our securities' prices even further below, or index-heavy securities' further above, what we believe they are worth.

These periods can be painful, but also ripe with opportunity. Two stocks in the portfolio that illustrate this particularly well are Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC), and Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E). In both cases, jolts of investor pessimism contributed to underperformance, but also gave us attractive opportunities to add to positions.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company

TSMC is the world's largest semiconductor foundry. You won't see their name on any product, but chances are their factories, or "fabs" in industry parlance, made many of the semiconductor chips in the electronic items you use every day. In fact, if you take apart your smartphone, computer, or car, you won't even see "TSMC" printed on any of the chips packed inside, but it's likely they made quite a few of them. TSMC manufactures the chips designed by "fabless" semiconductor companies like Nvidia, Qualcomm, and AMD, as well as for other customers like Alphabet, Amazon and Apple.

It wasn't always this way. Until the mid-1990s, having someone else build semiconductors to your design was unthinkable. Manufacturing was considered a core competence of every semiconductor company. Since then, each new generation of manufacturing technology has been much more expensive to develop. This has led increasing numbers of firms to hand off manufacturing to TSMC and other foundry specialists, so that they can focus on their core competence—design—while enjoying the lower fixed costs of the fabless life.

More recently, the technical difficulty and high expense (a new state-of-the-art fab can cost $15 billion) has even pushed other foundries off the leading/bleeding-edge manufacturing pace, leaving it to TSMC and to a much lesser degree Samsung Electronics.

This has proven a double benefit to TSMC. It benefits first by being the only choice of designers like Apple, Qualcomm and Nvidia who need their chips to be the fastest, smallest and most power efficient. But TSMC benefits again as those fabs age and are no longer leading-edge but still very much in demand. By the time the other foundry companies build a fab to compete with TSMC's four- or five-year-old plants, TSMC's are fully depreciated and are operating at peak efficiency. This affords TSMC the ability to run their non-leading-edge fabs as cash cows while still pricing at levels that starve their competition of the return they need to adequately fund research and development for future generations. TSMC is the rich that keeps getting richer.

Being the leader has been financially rewarding for TSMC—it has historically averaged a very consistent 25% return on equity and a similarly high return on invested capital. Meanwhile, its lead over other foundry pure plays has consistently lengthened. Just a few months ago, Global Foundries, the last foundry rival with aspirations of staying on the leading edge, announced it was giving up and focusing on older-technology fabs. And as more devices get smart and already-smart devices get smarter, we expect near-leading-edge semiconductor demand growth to be healthy for a long time, giving TSMC a long runway for increasingly profitable growth.

Orbis Global Balanced (continued)

Despite these attractive fundamentals, TSMC traded at just 15 times earnings during much of 2017—a below-average price for a far-above-average company, and well below what a dominant company in a high-growth critical industry should garner. We built a position throughout the year, but grew wary heading into year end.

While the market often disagrees with us, it isn't always because other investors are too pessimistic. They can be overoptimistic as well, and in late 2017 we thought investors were way too optimistic on the outlook for cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. That affected TSMC because of how Bitcoin works—it is facilitated by a global network of cryptocurrency "miners", who use powerful computers to solve difficult calculations. Each miner might have a warehouse full of specialised computer processors, and TSMC manufactured many of the chips for those processors. It was a gold rush, and TSMC was making the shovels.

As Bitcoin and other "cryptos" captured investors' imagination, TSMC got caught up in the enthusiasm, at one point being highlighted as the largest position in a new Cryptocurrency ETF! This pushed up the stock's valuation, and for us was a signal to tactically lower the weighting.

The bubble popped early this year, and those once-enthusiastic investors have grown bearish. Sentiment on TSMC overshot the other way, bringing its valuation briefly back to 14 times forward earnings and a near-4% dividend yield, despite no change to its long-term fundamental prospects. Thankful for the opportunity, we rebuilt the position (and then some), bringing the stock into the top ten holdings. In TSMC's case, the market's focus on short-term issues provided us with attractive opportunities to sell as well as buy.

Pacific Gas and Electric

PG&E is the largest electric utility in California. The economics of its business are odd. Most companies make more money if they sell more stuff. Not so for California's electric utilities. PG&E's revenues are de-coupled from electricity demand. Instead, utilities submit requests to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to collect a certain amount of revenue from their customers. This revenue is calculated to cover the approved costs the utilities incur to provide the service, plus a prescribed rate of return based on how much capital they have invested into power plants, transmission lines, and other useful infrastructure. Because of this setup, PG&E's fundamentals are influenced heavily by the decisions of the regulator, who in turn takes direction from laws passed by the California legislature.

Recently those interactions have spooked investors. In October 2017, the stock sold off following a series of devastating wildfires in California. Investors were fearful that PG&E would be hit with a massive liability due to a quirk in California law called "inverse condemnation", which holds utilities liable for damages that may have been caused in any degree by their equipment. The quid pro quo was to be that, after paying out to assist the recovery, utilities would recoup the payments through higher tariffs spread across all customers over a long period. The intent was to socialise disaster costs, but the execution was lacking. While the first part—the utilities cover the costs—was crystal clear, the law's language covering the second part—getting paid back—was not clear in the eyes of the CPUC. Thus, the first time a utility, San Diego Gas and Electric, filed for a rate increase after paying out for a wild fire, the CPUC denied it, saying that the utilities would need to get the legislature to amend the law to clarify the issue.

This seemingly simple fix became anything but when California suffered its worst wild fire year in history in 2017, with damages estimated at $17 billion. With uncertainty over who will pay, PG&E prudently eliminated its dividend and implicitly threatened bankruptcy. This ramping up of the stakes pitted those who benefitted from the poor wording—insurers, trial lawyers, and cities—against the utilities, unions, the CPUC and the governor. Politics indeed makes for strange bedfellows!

It was into this needless uncertainty, and a significant drop in PG&E's share price, that we built a top 10 position. Our confidence was bolstered by a review of the relevant legal precedents that pointed to a very high probability of the issues being resolved favourably in federal court if need be. We also took comfort from past experience with a very similar political mismanagement situation in 2001, where despite rolling blackouts and a bankruptcy filing by PG&E, investors were eventually made whole and the Governor was fired in a special referendum!

As time was running out to put a fix in place by the end of the 2018 legislative session in August, the politicians did their best not to anger the powerful forces on both sides. Despite the obvious need to simply

Orbis Global Balanced (continued)

fix some poor wording, they instead passed a measure that ensured PG&E's viability but kicked the tough decisions to the unelected CPUC and a blue ribbon panel appointed by the Governor.

While the market remains concerned, and PG&E's share price recovery has thus far been muted, we like the odds—the ball is now in the hands of a sympathetic CPUC and a supportive Governor. PG&E's political case is further bolstered by California's very ambitious green energy goals, as meeting those goals requires large investments in infrastructure. The state therefore depends heavily on private utilities to channel capital into green energy projects. Crushing a utility would scare off investors and starve the state of the capital it needs, so PG&E is a valuable and useful partner, a point the company has successfully highlighted in recent months.

Global Balanced started buying the stock in early 2018, when investor pessimism was most dire. The stock's valuation dropped close to 1.0 times its book value and 10 times normalised earnings—a level not seen since California's 2001 fiasco. Over time, our research developed increasing conviction that the stock's long-term fundamentals are sound, and we added meaningfully to the position, with the stock entering the top ten this August.

The remaining question is around what PG&E's ultimate liability will be for the 2017 fires and future disasters, but as ever, it is the relationship between the price and fundamentals that matters most. The nuts and bolts of the business—generating and transmitting electricity—are absolutely fine, but at 12 times our estimate of normal earnings, PG&E trades at a 30% discount to its utility peers and the wider market. We believe that prices in too high a probability of a worst-case scenario, that the actual expense is likely to be much lower than the headline number, and that the risk of future fire expenses is likely to be significantly curtailed.

The curse and blessing of being an intrinsic value investor

As TSMC and PG&E show, we continue to retain a singular focus on identifying securities that trade well below our assessment of intrinsic value. Quite often these opportunities arise due to highly visible short-term problems. While we can never know how long it will take for those issues to be resolved, we've found that after building conviction through fundamental research, patiently investing against other investors' fears has been quite rewarding.

The curse (or blessing!) of being an intrinsic value investor is that we are always unhappy about something. When performance has been good we tend to worry about the compression of potential in the portfolio, and the prospect of that leading to underperformance. When we've underperformed and are out of sync with the market, of course we're not happy, but we do enjoy the opportunities to add to high-conviction opportunities like TSMC and PG&E. During periods like this, we can never tell when or if the market will get back "in sync" with our portfolio views, but in our experience over many cycles, the rewards have historically been worth the wait.

Commentary contributed by Alec Cutler, Orbis Investment Management Limited, Bermuda

This report does not constitute a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any interests, shares or other securities in the companies mentioned in it nor does it constitute financial advice.

Orbis SICAV Global Balanced Fund

The Fund seeks to balance appreciation of capital, income generation and risk of loss with a diversified global portfolio of equity, fixed income and commodity-linked instruments. It aims to earn higher long-term returns than its benchmark, which is comprised of 60% MSCI World Index with net dividends reinvested and 40% JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index ("60/40 Index"), each in US dollars.

Price	US$15.63
Pricing currency	US dollars
Domicile	Luxembourg
Type	SICAV
Share class	Investor Share Class
Fund size	US$4.2 billion
Fund inception	1 January 2013
Strategy size	US$4.3 billion
Strategy inception	1 January 2013

Benchmark	60/40 Index
Peer group	Average Global Balanced Fund Index
Minimum investment	US$50,000
Dealing	Weekly *(Thursdays)*
Entry/exit fees	None
UCITS compliant	Yes
ISIN	LU0891391392

Growth of US$10,000 investment, net of fees, dividends reinvested



Returns (%)

	Fund	Peer group	Benchmark
Annualised	Net	Net	Gross
Since Fund inception	8.2	2.4	6.6
5 years	5.7	1.8	5.8
3 years	11.4	4.1	8.7
1 year	0.4	0.9	6.0
Not annualised			
Calendar year to date	(3.5)	(1.7)	2.2
3 months	(0.2)	0.2	2.3
1 month	1.3		(0.1)

	Year	%
Best performing calendar year since Fund inception	2013	24.8
Worst performing calendar year since Fund inception	2015	(3.4)

Risk Measures, since Fund inception

	Fund	Peer group	Benchmark
Largest drawdown (%)	14	12	7
Months to recovery	25	27	22
Annualised monthly volatility (%)	8.2	6.0	6.4
Beta vs World Index	0.7	0.6	0.6
Tracking error vs benchmark (%)	4.6	2.1	0.0

Ranking within peer group, cumulative return (%)



Asset Allocation (%)

	North America	Europe	Asia ex-Japan	Japan	Other	Total
Fund						
Gross Equity	30	23	12	8	5	78
Net Equity	*16*	*20*	*11*	*7*	*4*	*58*
Gross Fixed Income	18	0	0	0	0	18
Net Fixed Income	*18*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*0*	*18*
Commodity-Linked						4
Total	**48**	**24**	**12**	**8**	**5**	**100**
Benchmark						
Equity	39	13	1	5	2	60
Fixed Income	17	15	0	8	1	40
Total	**56**	**28**	**1**	**13**	**2**	**100**

Currency Allocation (%)

	Fund	Benchmark
US dollar	45	54
Euro	14	18
British pound	14	6
Japanese yen	12	13
New Taiwan dollar	4	0
Other	11	9
Total	**100**	**100**

Top 10 Holdings

	Sector	%
BP	Energy	4.8
AbbVie	Health Care	4.6
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg.	Information Technology	4.1
Treasury Note 1.125% 28 Feb 2019	Government Bond	4.0
Royal Dutch Shell	Energy	3.7
SPDR Gold Trust	Commodity-Linked	3.7
Bristol-Myers Squibb	Health Care	3.4
XPO Logistics	Industrials	3.0
PG&E	Utilities	2.9
NetEase	Information Technology	2.6
Total		**37.0**

Portfolio Concentration & Characteristics

% of NAV in top 25 holdings	65
Total number of holdings	82
12 month portfolio turnover (%)	55
12 month name turnover (%)	44

Fees & Expenses (%), for last 12 months

Management fee[1]	2.17
For 3 year performance in line with benchmark	*1.50*
For 3 year outperformance/(underperformance) vs benchmark	*0.67*
Fund expenses	0.10
Total Expense Ratio (TER)	**2.27**

Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Orbis Fund share prices fluctuate and are not guaranteed. Returns may decrease or increase as a result of currency fluctuations. When making an investment in the Funds, an investor's capital is at risk.

See Notices for important information about this Fact Sheet.

[1] 1.5% per annum ± up to 1%, based on 3 year rolling outperformance/ (underperformance) vs benchmark.

Orbis SICAV Global Balanced Fund

This Fact Sheet is a Minimum Disclosure Document and a monthly General Investor Report as required by the South African Financial Services Board. Please note that all references to the "Investor Share Class" in this document exclude the "Institutional Investor Share Class" referred to in the Fund's Prospectus.

Manager	Orbis Investment Management (Luxembourg) S.A.
Investment Manager	Orbis Investment Management Limited
Inception date	1 January 2013
Number of shares (Investor Share Class)	27,302,521
Income distributions during the last 12 months	None

Fund Objective and Benchmark

The Fund seeks to balance appreciation of capital, income generation and risk of loss with a diversified global portfolio. It aims for higher long-term returns than its designated combined equity and bond performance benchmark, which is comprised of 60% MSCI World Index with net dividends reinvested and 40% JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index, each expressed in US$ (the "60/40 Index").

How We Aim to Achieve the Fund's Objective/Adherence to Objective

The Fund is actively managed and invests in equities, fixed income instruments and commodity-linked instruments. Fund weightings among the different asset classes are determined based on their income, appreciation and risk of loss potential, with appropriate diversification. The Investment Manager may cause the Fund to be under or over the targets described in the remainder of this section when it considers this to be in the Fund's best interest.

Equities. The Investment Manager targets the Fund to hold 40-90% of its net asset value in a pool of global equities. The Fund invests in shares considered to offer fundamental value and dividend paying potential that is superior to its benchmark. The lower the price of a share as compared to its assessed intrinsic value, the more attractive Orbis considers the equity's fundamental value. The Investment Manager believes the main risk of investing in equities is that their prices will decline if relevant stockmarkets fall significantly. To reduce this risk, when Orbis' research suggests that stockmarkets are overvalued and vulnerable, the Investment Manager will reduce exposure to, or hedge, stockmarket risk. When Orbis' research suggests that stockmarkets represent good value, the Investment Manager will increase exposure to stockmarket risk by decreasing the amount of any hedging. The Fund may utilise exchange-traded derivatives for investment efficiency purposes by helping the Fund to be continuously fully exposed to equities (within the Investment Manager's targets) at all times. Furthermore, the Fund may buy and sell exchange-traded equity options for investment efficiency purposes, but only to the extent the Fund is capable of meeting its payment or delivery obligations related to such options, for example, by holding the underlying security.

Fixed Income Instruments. The Investment Manager targets the Fund to hold 10-50% of its net asset value in fixed income instruments issued by corporate bodies, governments and other entities. These are selected to provide current income, liquidity and portfolio diversification for the purpose of reducing risk of loss. When Orbis' research suggests that bond markets are overvalued and vulnerable, the Investment Manager will reduce exposure to, or hedge, bond market risk. When Orbis' research suggests that bond markets represent good value, the Investment Manager will increase exposure to bond market risk by decreasing the amount of that hedging. The Fund's fixed income selections in aggregate may differ significantly from the benchmark in duration and credit quality. In addition, the Fund may invest in money market instruments, cash and cash equivalents.

Commodity-linked Instruments. The Investment Manager targets the Fund to hold 0-10% of its net asset value in commodity-linked instruments, which may provide the Fund with indirect exposure to commodities. The Fund will gain exposure to commodities if the Investment Manager's investment research process identifies a commodity or class of commodities as being more attractive than overall equity and fixed income opportunities, taking into account any risk reduction benefits of diversification.

Exchange rate fluctuations significantly influence global investment returns. For this reason, part of Orbis' research effort is devoted to forecasting currency trends. Taking into account these expected trends, the Investment Manager actively reviews the Fund's currency exposure. Those currencies held but considered vulnerable may be sold in favour of those considered more attractive.

Since inception, the Fund has outperformed its benchmark net of fees. The Fund will experience periods of underperformance in pursuit of its objective of creating long-term wealth for investors. The Fund's holdings usually differ meaningfully from the 60/40 Index.

Risk/Reward Profile

- The Investment Manager aims to contain the risk of monetary loss to a level that is below the risk of loss experienced by global equity funds but higher than that experienced by government bond funds and cash deposits over the long term. Investors should be aware that this expected reduction in risk of loss comes at the expense of long-term expected return.
- Investments in the Fund may suffer capital loss.
- Investors should understand that the Investment Manager generally assesses an investment's attractiveness over a three-to-five year time horizon.

Management Fee

As is described in more detail in the Fund's Prospectus, the Fund's various share classes bear different management fees. The fees are designed to align the Manager's and Investment Manager's interests with those of investors in the Fund. With respect to the Fund's Investor Share Class, the fee is structured as follows: a fee is charged based on the net asset value of the class. The fee rate is calculated weekly by comparing the class' performance over three years against the 60/40 Index. For each percentage point of three year performance above or below that benchmark's performance, 0.04 percentage points are added to or subtracted from 1.5%, subject to the following limits:

- Maximum fee: 2.5% per annum
- Minimum fee: 0.5% per annum

For a description of the management fee borne by the Fund's other share classes, please refer to the Fund's Prospectus.

Fees, Expenses and Total Expense Ratio (TER)

The relevant class within the Fund bears all expenses payable by such class, which shall include but not be limited to fees payable to its Manager, Investment Manager and additional services providers, fees and expenses involved in registering and maintaining governmental registrations, taxes, duties and all other operating expenses, including the cost of buying and selling assets. However, the Manager and the Investment Manager have agreed that in the current calendar year, except for specified exclusions, operating expenses attributable to the Fund's Investor Share Class will be capped at 0.20%. Please refer to the Fund's Prospectus for a description of the fee cap applicable to its other share classes. Each cap will be automatically extended for further successive one year periods unless terminated by the Manager or the Investment Manager at least three months prior to the end of the then current term. The operating expenses that are capped are all expenses, excluding the Manager's and Investment Managers' fees described above under "Management Fee," the cost of buying and selling assets, interest and brokerage charges.

Where an investor subscribes or redeems an amount representing 5% or more of the net asset value of the Fund, the Manager may cause the Fund to levy a fee of 0.40% of the net asset value of the Fund's shares being acquired or redeemed.

The annual management fees charged are included in the TER. The TER is a measure of the actual expenses incurred by the class over a 12 month period, excluding trading costs. Since Fund returns are quoted after deduction of these expenses, the TER should not be deducted from the published returns. Expenses may vary, so the current TER is not a reliable indicator of future TERs.

Changes in the Fund's Top 10 Holdings

30 June 2018	%	30 September 2018	%
AbbVie	4.3	BP	4.8
BP	4.3	AbbVie	4.6
Royal Dutch Shell	3.7	Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg.	4.1
SPDR Gold Trust	3.5	Treasury Note 1.125% 28 Feb 2019	4.0
Bristol-Myers Squibb	3.1	Royal Dutch Shell	3.7
Treasury Note 1.125% 28 Feb 2019	2.9	SPDR Gold Trust	3.7
NetEase	2.8	Bristol-Myers Squibb	3.4
XPO Logistics	2.7	XPO Logistics	3.0
Alphabet	2.3	PG&E	2.9
Mitsubishi	2.2	NetEase	2.6
Total	**31.8**	**Total**	**37.0**

Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Orbis Fund share prices fluctuate and are not guaranteed. Returns may decrease or increase as a result of currency fluctuations. When making an investment in the Funds, an investor's capital is at risk.

Orbis SICAV Global Balanced Fund

Additional Information

South African residents should contact Allan Gray Unit Trust Management (RF) Proprietary Limited at 0860 000 654 (toll free from within South Africa) or offshore_direct@allangray.co.za to receive, free of charge, additional information about a proposed investment (including prospectus, application forms, annual reports and a schedule of fees, charges and maximum commissions). The Investment Manager can be contacted at +1 441 296 3000 or clientservice@orbis.com. The Fund's Depositary is Citibank Europe plc, Luxembourg Branch, 31 Z.A. Bourmicht, L-8070 Bertrange, Luxembourg. All information provided herein is subject to the more detailed information provided in the Fund's Prospectus.

Share Price and Transaction Cut Off Times

Share prices are calculated on a net asset value basis by share class, normally as of 5:30 pm (Bermuda time) (i) in the case of the Investor Share Class and Institutional Investor Share Class, each Thursday (or, if a Thursday is not a business day, the preceding business day), (ii) in the case of the Refundable Reserve Fee Share Classes, the first Thursday of each calendar month and any other Thursday on which an investor transacts in such class (or, if a Thursday is not a business day, the preceding business day), (iii) on the last calendar day of each month (or, if that is not a weekday, the preceding weekday) and/or (iv) any other days in addition to (or substitution for) any of the days described in (i), (ii) or (iii), as determined by the Manager without notice.

Subscriptions are only valid if made on the basis of the Fund's current Prospectus. To be processed on a given dealing day: subscription requests into an Orbis Fund that is not an Orbis SICAV Fund must be submitted by 5:00 pm on that dealing day; subscription requests into an Orbis Fund that is an Orbis SICAV Fund must be submitted by 5:30 pm; redemption requests from an Orbis Fund that is not an Orbis SICAV Fund must be submitted by 12 noon; redemption requests from an Orbis Fund that is an Orbis SICAV Fund must be submitted by 5:30 pm; requests to switch from an Orbis Fund that is not an Orbis SICAV Fund to a different Orbis Fund that is also not an Orbis SICAV Fund must be submitted by 12 noon; requests to switch from an Orbis SICAV Fund into a different Orbis Fund that is not an Orbis SICAV Fund must be submitted by 5:00 pm; requests to switch from an Orbis Fund that is not an Orbis SICAV Fund to a different Orbis Fund that is an Orbis SICAV Fund must be submitted by 12 noon; and requests to switch from an Orbis Fund that is an Orbis SICAV Fund to a different Orbis Fund that is also an Orbis SICAV Fund must be submitted by 5:30 pm. All times given are Bermuda time, and all requests must be properly completed and accompanied by any required funds and/or information.

Share prices, updated weekly, are available
- from the Allan Gray Unit Trust Management (RF) Proprietary Limited's website at www.allangray.co.za,
- from the Orbis website at www.orbis.com,
- by e-mail, by registering with Orbis for this service at the Orbis website at www.orbis.com, and
- from Bloomberg.

Legal Notices

Returns are net of Investor Share Class fees, include income and assume reinvestment of dividends. Figures quoted are for the periods indicated for a $10,000 investment (lump sum, for illustrative purposes only). Annualised returns show the average amount earned on an investment in the Fund/share class each year over the given time period. This Report does not constitute advice nor a recommendation to buy, sell or hold, nor an offer to sell or a solicitation to buy interests or shares in the Orbis Funds or other securities in the companies mentioned in it.

Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) are generally medium to long-term investments. The value of an investment in the Fund may go down as well as up, and past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. Neither the Manager nor the Investment Manager provides any guarantee with respect to capital or the Fund's returns. CIS are traded at ruling prices and can engage in borrowing and scrip lending. Commission and incentives may be paid by investors to third parties and, if so, would be included in the overall costs. Individual investors' performance may differ as a result of investment date, reinvestment date and dividend withholding tax, as well as a levy that may apply in the case of transactions representing more than 5% of the Fund's net asset value. The Fund may be closed to new investments at any time in order to be managed in accordance with its mandate. The Fund invests in foreign securities. Depending on their markets, trading in those securities may carry risks relating to, among others, macroeconomic and political circumstances, constraints on liquidity or the repatriation of funds, foreign exchange rate fluctuations, taxation and trade settlement.

The discussion topics for the commentaries were selected, and the commentaries were finalised and approved, by Orbis Investment Management Limited, the Fund's Investment Manager. Information in this Report is based on sources believed to be accurate and reliable and provided "as is" and in good faith. The Orbis Group does not make any representation or warranty as to accuracy, reliability, timeliness or completeness of the information in this Report. The Orbis Group disclaims all liability (whether arising in contract, tort, negligence or otherwise) for any error, omission, loss or damage (whether direct, indirect, consequential or otherwise) in connection with the information in this Report.

Fund Information

The benchmark is a composite index consisting of the MSCI World Index with net dividends reinvested (60%) and the JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index (40%).

Net Equity is Gross Equity minus stockmarket hedging. Fixed Income refers to fixed income instruments issued by corporate bodies, governments and other entities, such as bonds, money market instruments and cash and cash equivalents. Fixed Income regional allocation is based on the currency denomination of the instrument. Net Fixed Income is Gross Fixed Income minus bond market hedging.

Fund Minimum

Minimum investment amounts in the Fund are specified in the Fund's Prospectus, provided that a new investor in the Orbis Funds must open an investment account with Orbis, which may be subject to minimum investment restrictions, country restrictions and/or other terms and conditions. For more information on opening an Orbis investment account, please visit www.orbis.com.

Clients investing via Allan Gray, which includes the Allan Gray Investment Platform, an Allan Gray investment pool or otherwise through Allan Gray Nominees, remain subject to the investment minimums specified by the applicable terms and conditions.

Sources

The 60/40 Index returns are calculated by Orbis using end of day index level values licensed from MSCI ("MSCI Data"). For the avoidance of doubt, MSCI is not the benchmark "administrator" for, or a "contributor", "submitter" or "supervised contributor" to, the blended returns, and the MSCI Data is not considered a "contribution" or "submission" in relation to the blended returns, as those terms may be defined in any rules, laws, regulations, legislation or international standards. MSCI Data is provided "as is" without warranty or liability and no copying or distribution is permitted. MSCI does not make any representation regarding the advisability of any investment or strategy and does not sponsor, promote, issue, sell or otherwise recommend or endorse any investment or strategy, including any financial products or strategies based on, tracking or otherwise utilising any MSCI Data, models, analytics or other materials or information. JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index (the "GBI"): Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but J.P. Morgan does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. The GBI is used with permission. Copyright 2018, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved. The 60/40 Index may not be copied, used, or distributed without prior written approval.

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